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1 Describing science/policy boundaries 
The tasks science-based experts perform for policy are many. In the traditional set of 
instrumental tasks, experts provide factual information to policy makers, assess future policy 
outcomes, or determine effects of past policies. However, the practice of policy expertise is 
much more varied. Experts may criticise policy makers’ problem definitions, redefine 
problems, reframe policy beliefs, point at unanticipated outcomes, suggest alternative 
strategies, interpret policy and provide critical reflection, or even mediate in controversies 
(Bal et al., 2002, MacRae and Whittington, 1997, Renn, 1995). 
This does not imply that experts do or should do all of the above all the time. There is 
no universal list of experts’ tasks. Policy makers may prefer to rely on their own knowledge, 
their own mediating skills, or their own ability at critical reflection. Especially in times of 
difficult political bargaining, ‘critical reflection’ is the last thing politicians want, especially 
from the experts. In other cases, the very status of the expert is at stake and actors may 
attempt to redefine what can be considered a matter of expertise and what a matter of policy. 
That is why we can analyse the relation between experts and policy makers as a complex and 
contested division of labour. This division of labour consists of a boundary that demarcates 
who can and cannot be considered an expert in various degrees, and articulates the 
coordination between actors who have come to be considered ‘experts’ and ‘policy makers’. 
Such boundaries are the outcome of – and form the resources for – continuing boundary 
work, the further articulation, reproduction, or modification of this division of labour 
(Halffman, 2003, Gieryn, 1999, Gieryn, 1995, Shapin, 1992, Jasanoff, 1990). 
Over time, patterns have developed in this division of labour, varying between 
countries and policy sectors. Some advice giving tasks come to be recognised as important, 
and some as the job to be fulfilled by experts exclusively. Accordingly, the process of 
providing expertise is organised in different formats, ranging from ad-hoc expert committees, 
consensus conferences, contract research, to even informal meetings in a personal network. 
Hence, practices of advice giving develop into institutions, i.e. more or less routinised 
patterns in which expertise and policy are demarcated and coordinated. 
Governments have installed expert organisations for the specific purpose of advising 
policy. Such organisations develop a body of knowledge, formal and informal rules about 
how to provide advice, a more or less guaranteed budget, or a conception of what is and is not 
their business. Government departments have developed procedures for commissioning 
research, ranging from model contracts to informal routinised practices of commissioning 
expertise. Scientists also have developed institutions for expert advice giving, such as 
professional codes of conduct, networking platforms for meeting policy makers, or 
conceptions of what kind of public roles their profession should or should not play (Peters and 
Barker, 1993, Hoppe, 2002a). 
Most of the descriptions of this institutionalisation of science/policy boundaries tend 
to homogenise their account in one of two ways. The first and static homogenised account 
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describes patterns in science/policy boundaries as matters of national style. Such accounts 
attempt to identify a typical pattern in a country, and possibly relate this to crucial historic 
events (such as the imposition of the Code Napoléon), or the development in key macro 
institutions (such as the legal system or the civil service). For example, the US is typified as 
having an adversarial style of expertise, which is then related to an adversarial legal system 
and majoritarian politics. Such typifications are strong at accounting for the mutual 
connectedness of the institutionalisation of expertise and policy, the co-production of science 
and policy, but tend to have difficulty in accounting for short-term changes in the organisation 
of expertise or for the diversity between policy sectors (Bakker and Van Waarden, 1999, 
Renn, 1995, Vogel, 1986, Brickman et al., 1985, Halffman, 2003). 
The second and dynamic homogenising conceptualisation is that of the grand 
transition. Such accounts try to identify how science/policy boundaries are changing from one 
form to another, compensating for the static bias of the national style notion. For example, 
transition accounts will point at increased transparency and accountability of experts towards 
citizens, increasing possibilities of wider participation in the production and evaluation of 
expert knowledge claims. Similarly, binary notions such as mode 1/mode 2 science (Gibbons, 
1994) or normal/post-normal science (Ravetz, 1999) point at such transitions. Once again, the 
account tends to homogeneity: one state of affairs leads to another in an encompassing grand 
narrative. 
In this chapter, we argue that these homogenising accounts of science/policy 
boundaries fail to address the diversity of institutional patterns, as well as the wide-ranging 
ideological disagreements that form their backdrop. With very inductive empirical accounts 
of the development of public expertise in the Netherlands over the last decades, we will show 
how at least three patterns of science/policy boundaries can be identified: a corporatist, a neo-
liberal, and a deliberative pattern. In doing so, we want to acknowledge the importance of the 
connectedness of expert and political institutions of the national styles-approach, but, while 
acknowledging the importance of national macro-institutions, bring forward and make sense 
of the maelstrom of transitions in the organisation of public expertise. We will show that 
various patterns continue to exist next to each other in Dutch national expert institutions; that 
the tension between these patterns is loaded with ideological disagreement and contradiction; 
and that we find diverse processes of change rather than one transition. 
2 Corporatist expertise: the planning bureaus and the advisory councils 
In corporatist policy arrangements, a restricted set of what are considered a sector’s main 
policy actors are formally accredited to participate in the policy arena. In various forms and 
with considerable variation over time, (neo-)corporatist modes of decision making have been 
strong in the Netherlands, especially in socio-economic policy. In these modes, the 
institutionalisation of expertise takes one of two typical forms. In the first form, the formally 
accredited actors mobilise their own expertise. In the more technical negotiations, actors may 
even be represented by experts. For example, a university professor may participate in a 
negotiation over health insurance benefits to represent the position of patients. We see this 
pattern strongest in the old system of Dutch national advisory councils. In the second form, 
the experts draw up the playing field for the corporatist negotiations. Experts then act as the 
linesmen of politics, indicating within which constraints actors can operate. Just like in the 
soccer game, they wave a flag whenever the negotiation game exceeds budgetary constraints 
or becomes unrealistic about next year’s economic growth. This pattern can be found most 
clearly in the present position of Dutch planning bureaus. 
To start with the former, the Dutch corporatist tradition of ruling by consensus among 
an elite of ‘relevant actors’ (the model of recognised employer organisations and unions 
expanded to other sectors of society) had led to a large number of sector-specific advisory 
councils. By 1976, there were 402 of them, providing platforms for negotiation and attempts 
to build sectoral consensus. Not all of these were strictly advisory, as some even had tasks in 
policy implementation or regulation. The unbridled expansion of advisory councils eventually 
became a policy issue itself, resulting in a long list of reports. Over a period of two decades, 
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various reports advised how to reduce their number and create some order. Meanwhile, the 
advisory bodies themselves changed. Whereas an inventory of 1976 had counted a third of the 
membership of these councils as ‘independent experts’ (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het 
Regeringsbeleid, 1977), by 1993 this had become two thirds (Oldersma, 2002). The 
participation of various groups in ‘their’ policy sector was increasingly taken over by experts 
representing their position. 
This tendency to professionalise, the shift from interest representation to interest-
cum-knowledge representation, was eventually taken to a radical conclusion. At the initiative 
of the Ministry of the Interior, the debate resulted in two laws in 1997, one providing a new 
framework for advisory councils and one abolishing nearly all of the existing ones. After this 
radical reorganisation, there were only eleven major advisory councils left, next to about 
seven highly specialised ones. With the exception of one, the Social and Economic Council, 
all the advisory councils were now considered expert councils. They were to advise with 
knowledge rather than interests. Another key principle was that advisory councils were to 
break out of their policy-specific niches, ranging across policy sectors. Advisory boards were 
to become more general and less tied to the specific interests and perspectives of the 
traditional policy fields. However, given that these advisory councils resort under the 
responsibility of individual government departments and that some of them have very specific 
functions in policy, most advisory councils have remained sector-specific, although sectors 
have come to be defined somewhat wider than before. The logic of diverse government 
departments, each with their specific professional strongholds, style of operation, and sectoral 
networks, proved stronger than that of a legal reorganisation (Klink, 2000). 
To introduce a second major development, the Dutch planning bureaus provide 
government departments with assessments of the state of affairs and of future developments 
in their policy sector and relate these to policy options. The term ‘planning’ is somewhat 
misleading. They hardly ever ‘plan’ in the sense of selecting goals and allocating means, but 
rather analyse and forecast. The planning bureaus’ status in the Dutch polity is exceptionally 
commanding, to the degree that the environmental and especially the economic planning 
bureaus routinely assess likely outcomes of political parties’ programmes prior to elections.2 
Political parties who refuse to submit their programme to such an analysis find their position 
severely undermined. Even the presentation of an uncertified oppositional counter-budget in 
Parliament, as an alternative to the government’s annual budget, can be a political liability 
(Centraal Planbureau, 2003a, Van den Berg et al., 1993). For purposes of political negotiation 
and bargaining, predictions of economic growth, budget shortages, or unemployment figures 
are in most cases accepted as true and unproblematic inputs for decision making. In addition, 
government is even legally required to consult planning bureaus at some points in the policy 
making process and in the annual budget cycle. As such, the planning bureaus occupy 
positions as obligatory passage points for Dutch politics that would be considered 
unacceptably technocratic in most other countries (Van den Bogaard, 1998). 
By 2002, there were planning bureaus for economic policy (Central Planning Bureau, 
CPB, established 1947), social and cultural policy (Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, 
1973), environment (the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency in the National 
Institute of Public Health and the Environment, RIVM, which received the ‘planning bureau 
function’ officially in 1996), and urban and regional planning (the Netherlands Institute for 
Spatial Research,3 lifted out of the Department of Spatial Planning in 2002). The casual use of 
the term ‘planning bureau function’ now suggests that planning bureaus are an entirely natural 
phenomenon, a logical part of policy making: the ‘function’ needs to be fulfilled. However, 
the planning bureaus followed only one particular model for organising expertise, that of the 
Central Planning Bureau. Its strong reputation for econometric modelling, high policy impact, 
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and close ties with the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Finances brought other ministries 
to develop competing expert resources of their own for the departmental tug-of-war and 
formed an enviable status for other expert organisations. 
 With four official planning bureaus in place, there are many opportunities for tension. 
Advisory organisations, like professional organisations, survive by claiming specific areas of 
expertise or specific approaches that make them unique and worthy of collective funds in the 
ecology of knowledge (Abbott, 1988). Such strategising can take the form of competition, as 
different government departments pitch organisations and their reports against each other in 
the heat of political conflict. However, the planning bureaus seek their legitimation in 
‘independence’, in a ‘neutral’, or at least ‘third party’ stance with respect to the political 
process. In the presentation of hard figures, open competition is a high-risk strategy. It could 
easily lead to deconstruction of facts and mutual undermining of authority. In recent years, 
the planning bureaus have tended towards a strategy of accommodation, seeking mutual 
coordination through consultation. One example is the Planning Office Directors Consultative 
Committee, an informal structure negotiating the relations between the planning bureaus, but 
also articulating what it means to be and act like a planning bureau (Overleg Directeuren 
Planbureaus, 1996, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 2001, Centraal 
Planbureau, 2003b). 
The term ‘independence’ of the planning bureaus thus has a specific meaning: 
planning bureaus claim that blatant political influence will not alter their advice, even if 
unwelcome. However, ‘independence’ clearly has its limits, which is acknowledged by the 
planning bureaus themselves. For example, research agendas are coordinated with long-term 
policy perspectives and members of planning bureaus are often present as advisers at top-
level policy meetings (Centraal Planbureau, 2003c). In some cases, directors of the planning 
bureaus will even attend Cabinet meetings (Hoppe, 2002b). This is not surprising, as these are 
exactly the kinds of ‘dependencies’ that assure a productive cooperation between experts and 
policy makers. To enact ‘independence’ it needs to be articulated, specified in practices, rules, 
and institutional arrangements. Allowable dependencies need to be distinguished from 
unallowable ones; the organisation must be kept out of the vortex of mediated politics, and 
where it enters this vortex its image must be spun with care. 
In the attempt to create independence, there is some preoccupation with the 
organisational status of planning bureaus. The ‘closeness’ to their respective government 
departments tends to be understood as a matter of organisational schematics. Over the last 
couple of years, the newly preferred organisational status for the planning bureaus has been 
that of an agency, formalising the arms length position of planning bureaus. One of the key 
issues is the diversification of clients, since agencies normally do not work for government 
alone, but are expected to raise some of their own money on the contract research market. 
Presently, in the case of the RIVM, these clients are explicitly not to include industry (unless 
if requested by a government department) and the common planning bureau protocol also 
states that “commercial research assignments are generally seen as a threat to the credibility / 
independence of the planning offices” (Overleg Directeuren Planbureaus, 1996, Rijksinstituut 
voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu, 2003). 
These shifts thus represent ambivalent changes in the division of labour in corporatist 
patterns. Planning bureau assessments are not always received without objection and not all 
planning bureaus have achieved the status of the economic one, the CPB. However, the 
degree of acceptance of assessments as reliable, independent, and for all practical purposes 
‘true’, is remarkable. In spite of the fact that planning bureaus are seen as resources by 
various government departments, positioning them as ways to promote their policy agenda in 
their mutual competition, planning bureaus’ identification of expected policy outcomes tend 
to be widely accepted, thus creating the space within which bargaining is possible. Similarly, 
the advisory councils have moved from a logic of interest-cum-knowledge representation to 
one of representation of the issues and the state of ‘relevant’ knowledge. This does not mean 
that the restriction of policy access to the major actors, typical for corporatist decision-
making, has disappeared. Rather, experts have been repositioned, providing especially the 
executive with stronger leverage to break through corporatist deadlocks (Hemerijck, 1994). 
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Goals and preferences may vary, but in a political system that is highly diverse, with 
complicated coalition governments, having stern arbiters that judge the outcomes of proposed 
policies reduces the complexity of negotiations. In a fluctuating multi-party system where 
results of elections are always politically ambiguous and with strong tendencies to pacify 
conflict (rather than to humiliatingly defeat an opponent who could be a needed ally 
tomorrow), experts are welcomed as linesmen of politics. Especially in the case of planning 
bureaus, their verdict is accepted even if this means that some policy alternatives are blocked 
off by assumptions in a computer model that are technical and hard to question. 
3 Neo-liberal patterns in public expertise 
The development towards a (neo-)corporatist linesman of politics in Dutch expertise is only 
one. Other developments point in the direction of a growing importance of a neo-liberal 
pattern for the organisation of the science/policy boundary. Typical of this pattern are the 
small state philosophy, leading to the ‘externalisation’ of expertise out of government 
departments, and a strong emphasis on the market to coordinate expert resources. We already 
indicated that most planning bureaus have moved towards agency status. In addition, the 
erosion of the old corporatist advisory system at least ran parallel to the neo-liberal rejection 
of corporatist policy arrangements, where state and society are seen as unacceptably colluded. 
There are two more indications that a neo-liberal pattern of public expertise is becoming more 
important in the Netherlands: the radical externalisation of expertise at some ministries, and 
the growing contractualisation and commodification of expert knowledge. 
 Most government departments are entangled in a continuing struggle to find the most 
suitable position for expertise. While there is an increasing awareness of the importance of 
knowledge for successful policy making, and while concepts such as ‘knowledge intensive 
administration’, ‘knowledge infrastructure’, or ‘evidence based policy’ are increasingly 
popular among analysts (Beker et al., 2003, Paardekooper, 2003, Dijstelbloem and Schuyt, 
2003, Kronje, 2003), it is by no means clear what this means for the organisation of the 
science/policy boundary. This struggle is a matter of both the internal departmental 
organisation and of external relations with expert organisations. It is in this context that neo-
liberal solutions have surfaced most radically. 
First, is it preferable to have one research division in a department, or is research and 
knowledge to be managed within the various functional units of a department? The 
organisation of expertise in a department can have considerable consequences for the freedom 
sub-units may have to gather and supervise expertise. Distributed control over research may 
allow expertise to be fed into policy more directly, as long as the civil servants concerned 
manage the process well. A centralised research directorate, on the other hand, may be more 
apt at guaranteeing quality of research, at the potential cost of developing into an ivory tower. 
Various departments opt for different solutions here. For example, since about 1995, the 
ministry of Social Affairs and Employment toyed with the idea of a specialised research 
division. Proponents argued that it would lead to better and more shared knowledge. After 
much deliberation, a research division was indeed set up, only to be abolished again a year 
later. The ministry now focuses its knowledge management on permanent learning for its staff 
through an ‘Academy’, in correspondence with the ‘lifelong learning’ policy for the Dutch 
work force (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2003). In contrast, the 
department of Traffic and Water Management has experimented with a research division 
since the early nineties, which has resulted in a special Directorate for Knowledge and 
Development (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2003). 
However, secondly, departments have struggled with the question to what extent 
expertise can be externalised into more or less autonomous agencies – or should be 
outsourced to consultancies or other research organisations, among which universities. Over 
the last decade, some departments have externalised expertise in a quite radical way. The 
form of externalisation has varied and not all departments have followed suit. The department 
of Spatial Planning has kept part of its division of planning, but has created the Spatial 
Planning Bureau. The department of the environment continues to grant more autonomy to 
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the RIVM, first changing annual agreements on research to bi-annual ones, and eventually 
giving the institute agency status in January 2004. 
Externalisation comes with specific problems, which lead to new coordinating 
institutions. The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports has virtually lost all its short-term 
influence over research, as the major research institutes under its responsibility work only 
with longer term research programmes (such as the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau and 
the health research resources of the Dutch national fund for scientific research) (Beker et al., 
2003). In addition, this ministry has invested heavily in the development of independent 
‘knowledge centres’. This may lead to increased availability of knowledge in the policy 
sector, but most of these centres tend not to see government as their main client (see below). 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality has organised its expertise in a separate 
Expert Centre. The sole client of this Centre is the Ministry and it is to prepare and evaluate 
policy, as well as critically follow it. Nevertheless, the Ministry has its own department of 
Science and Knowledge Transfer, which is to operate as a knowledge broker 
(Expertisecentrum LNV, 2003a, De Wit, 2003, Ministerie van Landbouw, 2003, 
Expertisecentrum LNV, 2003b). The creation of such a knowledge broker seems typical. An 
increased distance may generate a stronger resource for building legitimacy, claiming 
‘independence’ of expertise, it also creates a gap between immediate policy needs and the 
agenda of professional researchers. This induces complex negotiations over mutual relations 
and degrees of control over research agendas. 
There may not be no single dominant pattern in the organisation of expertise within 
departments or in the degree of externalisation of research, but to the extent that research is 
externalised, there does seem to be a new development of complex and increasingly 
formalised negotiations over research projects and programmes. From the perspective of 
researchers, this development can be seen more clearly. Dutch government departments tend 
to keep an active role in the oversight of commissioned research. For example, the use of 
advisory committees has become standard practice. These committees are typically comprised 
of civil servants with some expertise in the matter at hand, as well as experts, usually 
sympathetic to the project. Advisory committees are consulted over the problem formulation 
at the beginning of a project, over the progress of projects, and over the end results. Careful 
selection of an advisory committee is acknowledged as a key instrument for maintaining 
control over a research project and for guaranteeing that the results will be of use for policy. 
In combination with financiers claiming ownership over reports and with disclosure clauses, 
government departments can exert considerable influence over the formulation of published 
reports and over the timing of their publication. In two recent cases that made the national 
newspapers, government departments used these instruments to prevent discussion of research 
results among scientists, rewrite conclusions or recommendations, or delay publication of 
unwelcome news (Ramdharie and Trommelen, 2003, Schreuder, 2003). 
Who gets commissioned? Although there are only very rough indicators of how 
government departments spend their research resources, it does seem clear that universities 
are slowly slipping out of policy makers’ favour, at least with national civil servants looking 
for policy advice. This follows the image portrayed by civil servants that departments 
presently favour either the authority of an established planning bureau or the convenience of a 
consultant – although universities are still good enough for €156 million’s worth of 
commissions every year. In many cases, policy makers see academic researchers as 
unpredictable, over-principled and as refusing to stick to the policy problem at hand. 
Especially in an instrumental approach to researchers as fact-finders, consultants may provide 
more suitable avenues. From their perspective, some Dutch social scientists have complained 
that the grip on commissioned research has become too tight, sometimes verging on 
manipulation (Köbben and Tromp, 1999, Sociaal Wetenschappelijke Raad, 2000). 
The amount of research government commissions to universities is relatively small in 
relation to their total research funds. The €156 million come out of €2.278 million in 2000 
(Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2003). Nevertheless, with 7%, this is still considerable 
and especially so for the social sciences and the unknown share they manage to obtain from it. 
In the second half of the nineties, university budgets have stagnated. Many social sciences, 
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such as sociology, have been faced with reduced numbers of students, partly for demographic 
reasons4 and partly because of the popularity of new programmes such as communication 
studies. Contract research may offer some extra oxygen for research groups. However, either 
at the initiative of individual researchers or of universities themselves, much of the most 
profitable research has been organised outside of the restrictive corset of university 
organisations, of academic peer pressure, and of civil servants’ employment regulations 
which still protect academics. Nevertheless, in the case of the social sciences, government is 
the main and sometimes the only client. Even though universities may no longer be as 
important to civil servants for advice, civil servants have become all the more important to 
academic social scientists looking for extra funding. 
Here too, we see commodification combined with a need for new forms of 
coordination. If there is a general line in the development of how government departments 
gather expertise, it is that of contractualisation: relations have become increasingly formalised 
and legalised. The control practices around commissioned research have refined, as in the 
practice of setting up advisory committees. In addition, some departments have developed 
guidelines on how civil servants should set up commissioned research, often accompanied by 
sample contracts and detailed rules. Even the relation between departments and their research 
institutes now has taken a contractual turn in which agreements are made on research 
programmes and targets. The internationalisation of the market of expertise and the increased 
competition between sources of expertise are likely to drive this development further. The 
contractualisation of research supports civil servants in setting up advisory relations with a 
wider range of researchers, even researchers or consultants who are not familiar. In spite of 
such advantages, the hidden transaction costs are considerable, for example in the form of 
legal overhead, over-instrumentalised knowledge, problematic accumulation of knowledge 
over time, or of new institutions to deal with newly produced problems of science/policy 
coordination. 
4 Shifts towards deliberative patterns of organising public expertise 
In deliberative conceptions of democracy, public reasoning and discourse are seen as crucial 
aspects of politics. Therefore, we call a deliberative pattern of public expertise all those forms 
of organising the science/policy boundary that position expertise as a collective resource in 
public debate, wherever this takes place (parliament, sectoral forums, media). The pattern is 
frequently connected with discourses of public participation, the importance of experiential 
knowledge, public accessibility of knowledge, and reflexive awareness of the possibilities and 
limitations of expertise (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003), thus contrasted with the restrictive 
nature of corporatist structures and the primacy for strictly representative democracy. We find 
the pattern most clearly in the experiments with interactive expert decision making stimulated 
by the Rathenau institute, the new phenomenon of ‘knowledge centres’, the improved self-
understanding of public expert organisations, and – much more ambivalently – in the 
expanded expert resources of the Dutch parliament. 
Traditional corporatist patterns of expertise to a certain extent did take into account 
opposing views in matters of expert knowledge. However, these patterns operated around 
relatively rigid corporatist channels of representation. The typical new issues of the risk 
society create new collectives, for which corporatist models prove insufficiently flexible 
(Beck, 1992 (1986)). For example, the initial attempts at regulatory negotiation and 
corporatist mediation in environmental issues, with the department of the environment 
stimulating the development of environmental groups through subsidies and the construction 
of statutory advisory boards in the eighties, gave way to new models in the nineties. This 
included government addressing societal actors directly, environmental groups negotiating 
with individual companies, or the construction of non-governmental regulatory bodies, such 
as for eco-labelling of food. In this setting, it is never a priori clear where relevant expertise 
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will come from. New actors appear around new policy issues, bringing their own knowledge 
or their own concerns about how policy expertise is framed. 
 A key actor behind new ways of handling expert knowledge in controversial issues 
that defied traditional policy making, was the Rathenau Institute. In its attempts to find ways 
out of the conundrums of ‘impact’ type of technology assessment and to clarify its position 
towards government, the Institute started to experiment with new forms of bringing experts, 
citizens, stakeholders and policy makers together. It copied elements of the Danish consensus 
conferences or of American citizen juries, but also thoroughly stimulated the innovation of 
interactive and constructive technology assessment. The methodology developed by the 
institute is slowly finding its way to other organisations, for example in transition 
management aiming for sustainable technology (Van Est et al., 2002). 
 Another interesting example of the deliberative pattern of organising expertise is the 
emergence of ‘knowledge centres’, since about 1998. Although quite a few research institutes 
have simply relabelled themselves to catch the buzz word, the new knowledge centres claim 
to be qualitatively different. They claim to make knowledge more available for policy use, 
either by integrating knowledge, simply accumulating knowledge, or by performing a role as 
knowledge broker. Knowledge centres are seen as facilitators of a collective and public 
learning process, targeted at practitioners in general, rather than governmental policy makers 
in particular (Beemer and Den Boer, 2003). Their organisational form ranges from merely a 
portal web site, run by a handful of people, to the research facilities of an entire university 
(Wageningen). There are currently about 115 knowledge centres, largely funded publicly 
(Ketting, 2002). Knowledge centres generally organise themselves around policy fields or 
specific policy issues, rather than around the traditional definitions of research fields or 
disciplines. For example, there are knowledge centres for sustainable building (Nationaal 
Dubo Centrum, 2003) or urban policy (KEI Kenniscentrum Stedelijke Vernieuwing, 2003, 
Kenniscentrum Grote Steden, 2003). Especially the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport has 
actively supported the creation of knowledge centres, leading to a boom in this area. 
What is new about the knowledge centres is not so much the claim of improved 
knowledge transfer, but their post-professional positioning, outside of those major 
strongholds of disciplines, universities, as well as established research institutes. This means 
knowledge centres can – in principle – operate across research fields and professional 
jurisdictions, integrating knowledge on an issue-basis in various forms of inter-disciplinarity. 
For example, the Knowledge Centre for Large Cities is setting up initiatives cutting across the 
division of labour between the social and physical aspects of urban planning (Kenniscentrum 
Grote Steden, 2003). 
Evidently, this raises questions about quality assurance. Professionalised knowledge 
may have the bad reputation of becoming boxed-in and even self-referential (e.g. Cole, 1998), 
but professions also provide a platform for quality standards. Especially the smaller 
knowledge centres seem to rely blindly on the professional standards of their suppliers of 
knowledge. They stress the very low threshold access to easily digestible bits of information, 
whereby such complex problems of knowledge uncertainty or problem framing run the risk of 
being swept under the carpet. To be sure, there is attention for such problems in the larger 
knowledge centres, but most knowledge centres have to legitimate their existence by 
providing ready-made knowledge for policy, if need be at the expense of complication 
(Janssen and Schouw, 2003). Knowledge centres may be useful for policy makers as a means 
to break through the iron triangles of corporatists structures, but they are also at risk of 
becoming an excessively instrumental and under-critical, but cheap resource for policy 
makers, which even lend themselves to token policy making (Beemer and Den Boer, 2003). 
Another striking development in the world of Dutch expertise for policy is an 
increased level of reflexivity among some of the major expert organisations. Major advisory 
organisations have produced reports touching on the status of knowledge in the policy process 
(in most cases their own knowledge), or have published (self)evaluations. Reflection on 
policy research has a tradition in the Netherlands, especially as supported by the ‘sector 
councils’. These councils of researchers, policy makers, and societal representatives 
traditionally reported on strategic goals for research in agriculture, health, nature and 
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environment, and development. However, the focus on strategic research goals and 
recommendations on how to achieve them, has now been complemented with reflection on 
how this research is to relate to policy and how expertise is to be organised (Hoppe and Huijs, 
2003, Raad voor Ruimtelijk Milieu- en NatuurOnderzoek, 2000, In't Veld, 2000). In this new 
frame of thinking, the sector councils too see themselves increasingly as (also) knowledge 
brokers. 
Several other examples stand out. The Scientific Council for Government Policy has 
produced several reports reflecting on expert policy advice, such as on uncertainty in 
environmental expertise (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 1994), or 
recently on ICT and policy knowledge (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 
2002) or the public role of knowledge (Dijstelbloem and Schuyt, 2002, Dijstelbloem and 
Schuyt, 2003). Uncertainty in expertise for policy is a theme that is receiving increasing 
attention, especially in environmental issues. Since about 1997, uncertainty of expertise has 
become a topic at the RIVM, exacerbated by a media scandal in 1999 about the alleged over-
reliance of the RIVM on computer models over actual measurements. Since then, RIVM has 
continued to organise (external) reflection of how it handles uncertainty and how it could 
construct better uncertainty management, some of which we are currently involved in (Van 
Asselt et al., 2001, Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu/Milieu- en 
NatuurPlanbureau, 2003). Also noteworthy is the increased use of external evaluation reports 
as an occasion for active reflection on the operation of advisory institutes. Unlike a decade 
ago, evaluation reports are now available for several advisory bodies. 
The increased reflexivity has come with a more relaxed attitude about allowing 
outsiders a glimpse into the back regions of expert knowledge production, glimpses which 
would have been considered inappropriate and undermining only ten years ago. However, the 
development is not shared everywhere. One reason is the lingering fear of making visible 
some of the contingent aspects of the construction of expertise, hence undermining credibility 
of expert advice. There are bureaucratic survival issues also. Even the suggestion of a 
negative evaluation report can have severe consequences for the continuation of advisory 
institutes, especially if their legitimacy was not entirely solid or in times of budget cuts. 
A more ambivalent, but interesting development is the expansion of the expert 
resources of the Dutch Parliament. In Dutch government, the centre of gravity in expertise 
lies with the ministries. The most important among them have direct access to major research 
institutes and expert advisory boards, neatly organised around their respective jurisdictions. In 
contrast, the Parliamentary resources were traditionally limited to a small library staff and 
modest administrative support. Even the larger political parties can only support research 
bureaus with about half a dozen researchers. Expanding Parliamentary expert resources was 
seen as a wasteful duplication of governmental bureaucracy and a source of instability for the 
detailed political agreements of the executive that form the basis of coalition governments. As 
a rule, MPs hence have to rely on Ministers for information, through oral and written 
questions in Parliament, or through motions. To the extent that the traditions of Dutch 
Parliament provide research resources, they take the form of Parliamentary investigations, 
executed by ad-hoc Parliamentary committees; or budgetary oversight, supported by reports 
from the feared and very old Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer). 
In principle, Parliament is the focal point of public deliberation and hence a key place 
to look for deliberative expertise. Over the last decade, the position of Parliament in matters 
of expert knowledge has been reinforced. In existing institutions, there has been a more 
intensive use of Parliamentary investigations and an important shift in the Court of Audit 
from budgetary oversight to ‘effectiveness’ of policy – and hence substantive policy 
evaluation. In addition, some newer institutions have appeared on the Parliamentary horizon. 
During the first half of the nineties, the Rathenau Institute, the Dutch organisation for 
technology assessment, came to consider Parliament as its main client, a view that was 
formalised in a new legal mandate in 1994. Recently, the Rathenau Institute has supported 
some of the research activities of Parliament, for example by providing expertise for the 
organisation of Parliamentary hearings, but also for Parliament’s new Research and 
Verification Bureau. This was installed in 2002 and is to support Parliament both with the 
 9
‘verification’ of expert reports offered by ministries, and with the commissioning of 
Parliamentary research, whether in the context of Parliamentary investigations or motions 
calling for research. 
The list of expert organisations Parliament could consult is open-ended, as long as 
resources are available. Since the reorganisation of advisory councils of 1997, legal 
provisions were made for Parliament to ask any of the remaining advisory councils for advice 
directly. Remarkably, an exception is made for the planning bureaus. Without an official 
mandate, individual members of the planning bureaus are not even allowed to talk to MPs, as 
stipulated in the national civil service regulations. However, various Ministers have had their 
own views on the issue, sometimes even relaxing the reigns on direct Parliamentary contacts.5 
So far, Parliament has made limited use of its new capacities to gather expert 
knowledge. With the support of the Research and Verification Bureau, eight research 
initiatives were undertaken since 2001, mostly through private consultants (Tweede Kamer, 
2002, Tweede Kamer, 2003). In general, Parliament sticks to the more familiar instrument of 
Parliamentary investigation committees, especially for addressing problems perceived by a 
majority as particularly pressing. Its style of dealing with expertise so far has rarely followed 
the logic of deliberative expertise, where experts and policy makers communicate on a more 
equal footing. With the possible exception of a few parliamentary hearings and some minor 
experiments, the logic of representative government that makes use of instrumental expertise 
has dominated. 
Here too, as with the other patterns, the pattern of deliberative expertise is therefore 
ambivalent and not without flaws. The new knowledge brokers in the knowledge centres may 
aim to improve public deliberation, but the risk of under-critical, unreflexive, and uncertified 
knowledge is clearly present. The reflection of large public expert organisations holds some 
potential for approaches to public deliberation of expert issues, but moves in this direction are 
very hesitant. Parliament seems to have an institutional gap to take a more active role in 
knowledge intensive policy issues, but leaves its instruments under-used or uses them in 
instrumental ways. 
5 Changes in the polity, changes in scientific advice 
Changes in the expertise/policy making boundaries in the Netherlands over the last decade 
have been complex. New organisations, new formats for expertise, and new policy issues 
have emerged in new arrangements, while old ones have not necessarily disappeared. We 
have pointed at such salient developments as the restructuring of the advisory councils into a 
small set of expert councils; the gradual expansion of planning bureaus; the externalisation of 
departmental expertise; the contractualisation and commodification of expertise; the modest 
expansion of parliamentary expert resources; the growth of ‘knowledge centres’; and the 
increasing reflexivity of expert organisations. 
We have ordered these developments in three competing patterns for the organisation 
of the science/policy boundary. In corporatist patterns, where a limited set of actors is 
formally accredited to participate in decision making as representatives of societal interests, 
experts either participate to represent knowledge considered relevant in a corporatist style 
advocacy behind the scenes, or guard the boundaries of the playing field for corporatist 
negotiations. In the Netherlands, we have observed a shift from the first pattern to the latter. 
However, next to these, new patterns are becoming stronger. One is a neo-liberal pattern, 
which removes expertise from the state and its negotiation structures and uses the market as a 
means to coordinate expertise. The pattern does not come without a price. Transaction costs 
tend to be high, in the form of increasingly complex contractualisation of professional work, 
                                                     
5 One last addition is the recent announcement of the installation of a council of economic advisers. 
Three top economists are to provide Parliament with countervailing analytic power against the weight 
of the Central Planning Bureau. It is as yet entirely unclear how this council will operate, but previous 
experiences with a similar council in the UK are not very reassuring Collins, H. M. and Pinch, T. J. 
(1998), The Golem at Large: What You Should Know About Science (2nd edition), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.. 
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which tended to rely heavily on personal trust and negotiation. In addition, there are risks of 
undermining accumulation of knowledge over time, as past knowledge is stored in volatile 
consultancy firms and untraceable grey literature, and of instrumentalising research and hence 
undermining quality. Last, we see a number of these developments as examples of a 
deliberative pattern in the science/policy boundary, where public decision making is 
predominantly seen as a matter of collective reasoning and argumentation, stressing large 
degrees of participation in matters of interest as well as knowledge. In this pattern, the 
inclusion of the plurality of sources of knowledge is stressed, leading to new ways of 
integrating heterogeneous expertise, under increasing reflexive awareness of its limitations. 
There are various ways in which this pattern can be played out, for example ranging from 
stronger expert resources for parliamentary debate to policy sector knowledge brokers. 
 Similar shifts can be found in other countries. For example, in Germany an expansion 
of parliamentary expert resources has also been noted (see Brown, Lentsch and Weingart, this 
volume), as well as a similarly hesitating acknowledgement of the plurality and distributed 
nature of knowledge (Heinrichs, 2002). Points of comparison can also be found in other 
European countries (Glynn et al., 2001). Such shifts reshuffle the division of labour between 
experts and policy makers. For example, handling and interpreting uncertainties is a task for 
the experts where they are the linesmen of politics; but for the policy maker where expertise 
is hired on the market on an ad-hoc basis; and one that is typically shared in collective 
reflection in deliberative patterns of organising expertise. Similarly, experts taking up tasks of 
conflict mediation is seen as perfectly legitimate in the deliberative pattern, but something to 
be avoided by the corporatist linesmen. 
Our objective here is not to show how the Netherlands is unique or different from 
other countries, but to show that within a country such as the Netherlands, various patterns for 
organising science/policy boundaries are competing with each other. We have intentionally 
labelled these patterns with terms that allude to political connotations, both because of how 
the organisation of expertise is co-constructed with the organisation of political decision 
making, and because we want to point at the ideological connotations of these patterns. 
Rather than a grand transition from one mode of public expertise to another, or some essential 
national style, driven by a handful of constitutional prime movers, we see multiple patterns in 
tension and competition with each other. These patterns conflict and vie for dominance, argue 
against each other, and hence partly develop in response to each other. Such is the make-up of 
modern polities and the fact that we find similar tensions in the organisation of expertise, only 
shows how much expertise has become embedded in these polities. 
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